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An Economics of Wellbeing: What Would Economics Look Like if it were 
Focused on Human Wellbeing? 
 
Nicky Pouw and Allister McGregor  
 
Summary  
 
This paper makes a number of fundamental proposals to reconsider economics by putting 
human wellbeing at the centre. It emerges from a pluralist perspective in economics and the 
ontological, conceptual, axiomatic and methodological propositions that are made lead to the 
construction of what we call an inclusive economy matrix (IEM). In particular, the paper 
draws on heterodox economics to redefine the scope of economics, economic agency, 
rational behaviour and put emphasis on wellbeing rather than welfare. Furthermore, from the 
acknowledgement of human wellbeing as a three-dimensional concept, the economic 
aggregation problem is reconsidered and the methodological implications discussed. The 
IEM is proposed as a comprehensive and robust analytical framework that gives space to 
bring social equity and sustainable development considerations forward as a priori concerns 
for economic development. As such, the IEM can serve as a point of departure for 
formulating new research questions, exploring new relationships between human wellbeing 
and economic development, and building economic models that bring us closer to people’s 
realities on the ground.  
 
Keywords: human wellbeing; poverty; inequality; sustainability; economic growth; theoretical 
framework.   
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1 Introduction  
 
There is growing concern in economics that presently dominant frameworks of thinking are 
no longer adequate to fully address and analyse the problems of today’s globalising and 
rapidly changing economies (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009; Medema 2010; Coyle 2007, 
2011; Jackson 2011; Ostrom 2012; Evensky 2012; Sent 2012 and others). Following the 
crisis of 2008 the recognition that there are major global problems, such as persistent 
debilitating poverty, growing inequality and environmental destruction are systematically 
overlooked by our contemporary economic frameworks. Economic power increasingly 
dictates development outcomes and the relentless pursuit of growth leads to the 
underestimation of risks in financial models (e.g. Krugman 2011; Colander et al. 2009). As a 
result, investments in forms of development and social change that would promote social and 
environmental sustainability are often afterthoughts in economic planning and are only 
discussed if economic growth is considered high enough to afford such luxuries. Referring 
back to Dudley Seers’ path-breaking paper on ‘The Limitations of the Special Case’ (1967), 
we argue in this paper that there is a need again to question this ‘growth-fetishism’ and to 
modify our economics so as to acknowledge the increasingly urgent concerns for our social 
and natural environment. Seers questioned the neoclassical approach to development by 
pointing to the relative nature of value judgements about development. Cost-efficient 
production may not constitute the only origin of economic and social progress.  
 
The many debates among high-standing economists and with other social scientists at this 
time provide insights into possible routes for making a change in economics. In 2009, the 
Final Report of the Sarkozy Commission (Stiglitz et al. 2009) argued that it is necessary to 
shift economists’ prime attention from growth and welfare to a broader concern for human 
wellbeing. In their challenging recommendations they propose the use of complementary 
economic performance indicators, alongside gross domestic product (GDP), to better capture 
societal progress, the sustainability of that progress and the quality of life it delivers. In 
particular this would include indicators on social relations and the subjective values and 
evaluations that underpin our judgements about our quality of life. Many countries around the 
world have taken up the challenges of the Sarkozy Report and are developing new 
measurement regimes to test whether the development that they experience is delivering a 
better quality of life to their citizens. For example, the Measures of Australia’s Progress 
initiative of the country’s Bureau of Statistics is seeking to measure progress in terms that 
citizens have told them matter to them. This involves assessments in economic, social and 
environmental dimensions and the development of a more comprehensive set of 
(quantitative and qualitative) indicators (ABoS 2012). Similar initiatives are underway in 
national statistical agencies in countries as diverse as the UK, Italy, Chile, Morocco, Mexico 
and the Philippines.  
 
The World Development Report 2012, on ‘Inclusive Green Growth’, predicates that ‘[T]he 
way forward requires a blend of economics, political science, and social psychology—smart 
solutions to tackle political economy constraints, overcome deeply entrenched behaviours 
and social norms, and develop the needed financing tools.’ (World Bank 2012: 1). According 
to Krugman (2011) and as stated in his presidential address to the Eastern Economics 
Association, ‘economists have failed to fulfil their social function’ (2011: 310). He reminds 
economists therefore to ‘remember what our fathers’ learned’ and that they might ‘need 
some kind of sociologist to solve our profession’s problem.’ (2011: 312).   
 
However, underpinning all of these debates there remains the question: What would have to 
change in economics if we were to address issues of social equity and environmental 
sustainability a priori? This is what we seek to provoke discussion on in this paper. In 
beginning to answer this question, we will argue that this requires fundamentally, that we 
start with a different conception of the human being (McGregor 2004, Douglas and Ney 
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1998); one that is ontologically different from the singular and reductionist notion of ‘homo 
economicus’, or rational economic agent (see also Sen 1977, 1979). This cannot be done 
without due reconsideration of other key economic concepts, their related principles/axioms 
and methods consanguineous to welfare economics, building on the groundwork laid by the 
various sub-fields of economics, in particular the strongly resurgent field of behavioural 
economics (Gintis et al 2005; Khaneman and Thaler 2006; Bowles and Gintis 2013). 
Together, these fundamental propositions lead us to construct an alternative framework 
designed to study the economics of human wellbeing. This framework is by no means 
conclusive, but illustrates the possibilities that emerge if we open-up the economics discipline 
to other social science perspectives and ideas, whilst at the same time preserving the 
robustness of the analysis.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section one, we explore the 
epistemological claim that economics would benefit from a pluralistic approach to economic 
theory and methodology. It is our contention that for understanding and analysing economic 
development problems, a pluralist perspective provides more room to alternative judgements 
and value settings regarding the process and direction of ‘development’. In section two, the 
conceptual and theoretical points of departure of a more comprehensive perspective on an 
economy of wellbeing are elaborated. In section three we discuss reasons why and how to 
redefine the economic agency concept, as well as its underlying assumptions about rational 
choice. Section four broadens out economics to focus on human wellbeing rather than 
welfare. This poses challenges to the economic aggregation problem. Instrumental to the 
associated methodology of this is to distinguish between individual and collective wellbeing. 
Together, these propositions build up to the presentation of an ‘Inclusive Economy Matrix’ in 
section five, as an illustrative framework for studying the economics of wellbeing. The 
methodological implications of such a framework and questions for further exploration are 
also discussed in this section, followed by our concluding remarks in section six.  
 
2  A case for pluralism in economics 
 
In his ‘Limitations of the Special Case’, Dudley Seers (1967) argued that post-war 
neoclassical economics had developed blind spots for social equity and environmental 
sustainability in developing countries. In more recent times the economic rise of China, India, 
Brazil, Russia and Turkey is accompanied by growing inequality and negative spill-over 
effects on the environment (e.g. Liu and Diamond 2005; Kaygusuz 2007; Baer 2008; OECD 
2008; World Bank 2010, 2013). Orthodox economic growth models dominate the 
development process also in these countries, where politicians show limited concern for 
marginalised groups and the environment. Development outcomes seem to strengthen the 
economic and political power of those who are already in a privileged position, whereas, 
people at the bottom of the income distribution are losing their connection to the 
development process, find themselves in life-threatening situations, and see the sources of 
their livelihoods further eroded. In the words of Smith and Max-Neef (2012): ‘There is never 
enough for those who have nothing, but there is always enough for those who have 
everything’ (2012: 128-129). The world is ‘under the spell of a dehumanized economy’ (2012: 
128), and as they go on to say, this will have repercussions on the stability of economic 
growth and human wellbeing in the longer run (see also Coyle 2011; Skidelsky and Skidelsky 
2012). These critics argue, that eventually the monist economic frameworks and the 
associated methodologies will lead to mis-directed economic policy and the self-defeat of the 
discipline. They point to the 2007 financial crisis as testimony of that and recent debates in 
the US media address the possibility of a further economic implosions in the US and China.1 
                                                 
1  See for example on China, Will Hutton in The Observer, 30th July 2011; on USA, Dan Weil in Money News, 13th 
February 2013.  
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More moderate critics take the view that the profession is at least in crisis, not the least 
because economists failed to predict or foresee the possibility of the current financial crisis 
(Krugman 2011). Recommendations on possible routes for making a change in economics 
vary from a more modest ‘opening-up of the discipline’ to take on board insights and 
epistemological viewpoints of other social-sciences disciplines, to embracing a pluralistic 
approach to economics as the overarching point of departure. As ‘mainstream’ economics is 
begins to show signs of becoming more pluralistic again, the timing is right to tie some of 
these new insights together. Contributions from institutional economics, from feminist 
economics, and from behavioural economics (to name but three areas of new work) can all 
be brought together to explore the possible building blocks of a more humane economics. 
 
In her article on ‘Pluralism in Economics’, Esther-Mirjam Sent develops the argument that 
‘[a]…lack of success of monism in economics, strengthens the case for pluralism’ in both 
theory and methods (Sent 2012: 2). This lack of success, according to Sent, stretches out 
over a number of decades. The 2007 financial crisis can be seen as the most recent event 
that provides empirical and theoretical support to Sent’s ‘plea for pluralism’. Support for 
pluralism in economics is not new, but the current challenge is how pluralism can be 
functional to economists without having to lose the robustness of the discipline? Moreover, 
an additional challenge is teaching economics to undergraduates in a way that not only 
benefits a minority pursuing a PhD, but especially the larger number becoming economics 
professionals. As Anand and Leape argue (2012) in Diane Coyle’s latest book ‘What’s the 
Use of Economics?’, aside from techniques and mathematical skills, professional economist 
need knowledge on institutional context and history, together with communication skills, Back 
in 1976, Bob Coats2, essentially meant the same thing when he used post-Kuhnian language 
to describe pre-war and inter-war economics as ‘having usually been poly-paradigmatic, 
rather than mono-paradigmatic’, and with good reason (Coats 1976: 13). Monism (or 
monoparadigmatic), in both examples, refers to the singular and exclusionary use of (1) a 
key ontological viewpoint on the rational economic agent; (2) principles and axioms; and (3) 
methodology. Let us consider an example of each.  
 
First, by virtue of the foundational position of seeing all economic agents uniformly as being 
rational and well-informed people that solve their economic problems in one optimal manner, 
being quite detached from their other, multiple identities, we overlook the complexity and 
heterogeneity of economic agents (e.g. Anand 1993; Kahneman 2003; Sen 2006; Kahneman 
and Thaler 2006; Sent 2012). ‘Homo economicus’ has rather exclusionary traits and 
characteristics to which not many women and men in the real economy comply (Kuiper 
2001). The neoclassical axiom of the optimising economic agent under assumptions of strict 
convexity and monotonicity (Sent 2012: 11), does not hold in the real economy where lack of 
awareness and information, unstable3 and adaptive preferences (Sen 1985; Nussbaum 
2000), psychology, cultural and historical values, and other subjectivities (e.g. morality and 
custom, van Staveren 2001) influence the range of alternatives and decisions. Moreover, 
economic agents face a wide range of economic problems, both in- and outside the market 
domain, that need to be resolved when they engage in the allocation (production, 
consumption and distribution) of scarce resources (see also Sen 2006, on multiple identities). 
Economic decisions made in one domain (e.g. the decision to work ten hours per day, has 
implications for the command over the distribution of the scarce resources of time and money 
in the household and public domains). For this reason, feminist economists have long argued 
for the need to consider the paid and unpaid economy as two sides of the same coin. Such 
epistemological reconsiderations can be made once we open-up to a different ontological 
                                                 
2  A.W. (Bob) Coats was an economic historian and important thinker on the sociology of economics approach, that he 
introduced in Great Britain in the 1980s by means of his investigations on the role of economists in governments and 
international agencies. 
3  Assar Lindbeck, back in 1971 in his book The Political Economy of the New Left, already pointed to the problematic 
practice of taking consumers’ preferences as given. This creates disincentives for economic analysts to take consumer 
preferences to be a serious matter for study. 
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departure point, and replace the rational economic agent with a more complex and humane 
person that is subject to bounded rationality and can strive at most for ‘purposeful behaviour’ 
in solving her and his economic problems.  
 
Monism in economic conceptualisation is also contested by Schlefer (2012). Underlying ‘the 
metaphor of the invisible hand’, he says, is ‘the single-point theorem’, which is in essence a 
mathematical idea.4  According to the single-point theorem, there exists a function F that has 
at least one fixed point in a continuum of points for which F(x)=x, with F having a number of 
properties that can be stated generically. Economic agents gravitate toward this point as if 
led by an invisible hand. However, economists have never been able to prove this theorem, 
instead, an ‘auctioneer’ is imagined to move agents toward the single optimum point 
(Schlefer 2012: 9). In a multi-dimensional spectrum and continuum of possible alternative 
solutions to an economic problem, the idea that multiple optima exist is then more likely than 
a single optimum point. 
 
Another deviation from the singular optimum notion, are those situations in which only bad 
alternatives present themselves (for example, in situations of widespread poverty and 
hardship, Pouw 2011). The optimal point at which the economic agent is behaving rationally 
and in a cost-optimising manner, may not be among these possible alternatives. If the person 
wants to survive in the short run, then only sub-optimal solutions are possible. Finally, even if 
multiple identities and heterogeneity across agents are acknowledged a priori, economic 
model construction commonly proceeds on the basis of the average behaviour observed. 
Most economic models benefit from removing outliers and extreme points from the analysis. 
In this way, economic analysts (and their students) tend to develop blind spots for 
exceptional or minority cases – whereas we know that critical change and economic tipping 
points are often induced from the margin. ‘[T]he special case’, in the sense of Dudley Seers 
(1967), causes outliers to be removed from economic modelling exercises for the greater 
benefit of producing impressive model results, that strengthen the theoretical model but have 
less to do with reality on the ground.  
 
One reaction to this has been the recent development of agent-based models (ABM), for 
example by Joseph Stiglitz and colleagues.5 ABMs simulate individual and collective agent 
behaviour by building in elements of complexity theory, game theory, and evolutionary, 
emergent and heterogeneity principles. Sent (2012: 14) would refer to these conceptual 
models as an example of ‘moderate pluralism’, since many of the basic principles and 
methodologies remain exclusionary and monistic. The only change vis à vis the rational 
economic agent assumption is that economic agents are heterogeneous and behave in an 
unpredictable (so-called ‘irrational) manner. The aggregated outcome of that behaviour will 
automatically surface by re-running (parts of) the model numerous times. No changes other 
than this are made with regard to economic concepts, theories and the relationships studied.     
 
Second, monism in economic principles and axiomatic rules has been disputed by 
economists and non-economists alike, on multiple grounds. One of the biggest challenges 
economists face is how to approach the aggregation problem: that is how to connect 
microeconomic phenomena and processes with macroeconomic outcomes and vice versa. 
Institutional economists such as Coase 1991, 1998 and North 1995 have tried to fill this gap, 
but have only partially succeeded because of their relative neglect of non-market institutions 
and of the history of institutional change (Chang 2003). Over time, the realisation has grown 
that economic aggregation problems cannot simply be approached uniformly as a static 
endogenous summation problem (i.e. the summation of stable preferences). Endogenous 
                                                 
4  Schlefer (2012: 9) draws the analogy with a geometric idea about the unique point of gravitation to which all water 
navigates in a cup of swirling water. 
5  Various presentations on ABM were given at the Eastern Economics Association (EEA) Conference 2011 in New York, 
attended by the author.  
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summation builds in blind-spots for two reasons: First, it sidelines potentially important 
exogenous factors that present themselves at higher levels of aggregation. Exogenous 
factors could be political, social, cultural and historical in nature and are known to determine 
economic processes, policies and outcomes in decisive ways, as has been argued by Karl 
Polanyi (1944) and many heterodox economists after him – see for example the critical 
economic works by Nancy Folbre (1994), Mark Lutz (1999), van Staveren (2001), John Davis 
(2003), Ben Fine (2010), and Frederic Lee (2010), to name just a few. Second, it ignores the 
possibility of emergent properties of functional relationships showing-up over time. Emergent 
properties are usually unknown and present themselves in the very process of aggregation. 
For example, people’s preferences may change because of certain needs and wants to be 
fulfilled. Also, preferences adapt according to changes over people’s life-cycle as the product 
of a dynamic change.  
 
Emergent properties thus imply a (continuous) qualitative transformation of the relationship 
between micro and macro variables and functions. A famous example of this is the 
Sonnenschein (1972) and Debreu (1974) argument that the weak axiom of revealed 
preferences may not be satisfied at the macroeconomic level (Sent 2012). In other words, 
the maximisation of consumption by means of individual utility may not be preferred at the 
aggregate level of a macro or global economy, because of social and environmental 
externalities that can diminish the present and future wellbeing and growth. From that 
perspective, there is something to say for the limits of growth or ‘the economics of enough’ 
(Coyle 2011, Skidelsky and Skidelsky 2012). In order to decide, what is ‘enough’ economic 
growth and why, we need subjective assessments based upon both quantitative and 
qualitative knowledge. There is no objective way of deciding ‘what is enough’ and ‘for 
whom’? This involves non-numerical value judgements that are grounded in cultural notions 
of justice. The political ideology of such principles is expressed in the kind of redistributive 
mechanisms built in the political-economic system (income tax, social services, etc.).  
 
This brings us to the third manifestation of the problem; monism in methods. Since Jevons’ 
(1871) The Theory of Political Economy, economists have sought to develop a more 
‘scientific’ approach to doing economic research that resembles the natural sciences by 
promoting deductive reasoning and mathematical analysis as the dominant methodological 
approach and method (Schlefer 2012: 75). Especially in post-war neoclassical economics, 
greater objectivity, and therefore ‘scientific value’, has been assigned to the monistic use of 
quantitative methods and techniques. Where quantitative analysis and mathematical models 
can usefully shed light on average patterns and trends, they do not explain the ‘how’ and 
‘why’ behind the phenomena observed. The theoretical models used, the relationships 
studied and the questions asked all arise from a particular worldview (weltanschauung), 
which entails value judgements, political decisions and which reflect ideologies. The most we 
can strive for, as Amartya Sen (1993: 127) argues is ‘positional objectivity’.  
 
Moreover, as Stiglitz et al. (2009: 144) point out, economists are confronted increasingly with 
the challenge of measuring ‘intangibles’ in the economic system. This is caused by a growing 
share of economic production and trade consisting of private and public services that employ 
both tangible and intangible goods, and involve high levels of human capital (e.g. financial 
services and public health services). These are notoriously difficult to measure (Stiglitz et al. 
2009), implying that quantitative analysis alone does not bring us far enough in studying 
present-day economic processes and outcomes. 
 
As a result, and because of the self-reinforcing and institutionalised reward mechanism6 of 
monistic theories and practices in economics, many economic models are quite detached 
from the economic reality on the ground. To make matters worse, the empirical testing of 
                                                 
6  The ‘perversity’ of the reward system of the economics profession refers to the publication of quantitative studies 
primarily by the top economic journals, has already been criticised by J.M. Blackman in Coates (1976: 10).  
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economic models is often skipped; a model can be the objective of a scientific paper itself, 
without empirical testing. This is rather strange if we think like a mathematician, whom would 
always seek to solve her or his equations. The problem is thus not in the mathematics; it is in 
the half-hearted way mathematics is used by economists. Theoretical models in economics 
are not sufficiently tested on real world data. Moreover, ‘model uncertainty’ (induced by 
variability and complexity) ‘should be taken into account by predicting more than a single 
model’ (Colander et al. 2009: 6). By looking at what raw data are telling us, in a heuristic 
manner, a range of different models can usually be thought of and empirically tested for their 
adequacy to a particular problem. Pluralism in economic research strategies could help to 
analyse economic problems from a more comprehensive perspective, answering the what, 
why and how questions in a more integrated manner. An acceptance of methodological 
pluralism would mean that both qualitative and quantitative methodologies were valued, and 
that whichever one or a mixed-methodology was to be used would depend on the issue to be 
studied7. In conclusion, a pluralistic approach to economic methodology conceives added-
value of a more heuristic approach to economic analysis; model building and scenario 
prediction (e.g. see also Sent 2012). 
 
However, where pluralism in economics creates space for multiple frameworks of thought, 
theories and methodologies, e.g. behavioural economics, experimental economics, feminist 
economics, it is also feared that it brings a risk of losing scientific rigor. As a result, we 
observe a disconnection between a certain degree of pluralism in economics already being 
practised, and the type of articles being published in high-ranked journals. The point of view 
to which we subscribe to here has been carefully posited by the International Confederation 
of Associations for Pluralism in Economics (ICAPE) in the following terms, ‘This is not to say 
“anything goes,” but that each tradition of thought (Austrian, feminist, old and new 
institutionalist, Marxian, neoclassical, Post Keynesian, social economics, Sraffian, etc.) adds 
something unique and valuable to economic scholarship.’ (ICAPE 2012)  
 
In proposing an alternative framework of thought for the economic analysis of wellbeing in 
this paper, therefore, we foresee and accept as one of our biggest challenges to safeguard 
the methodological robustness of a mixed-methodology type framework. 
 
3  An instituted economy 
 
The first starting point in what we would call a more ‘inclusionary’ perspective in economics is 
the recognition of the economy as an instituted process. As exemplified by Polanyi (1944) 
and further reflected in the work of Amartya Sen on capabilities, freedom, and identity (Sen 
1989, 1993, 1999, 2006), this type of approach combines political economy and social 
analyses. Recent work developing the concept of and methodology for understanding human 
wellbeing takes the same approach, seeing the state of human wellbeing as ‘ … an outcome 
that is continuously generated through conscious and sub-conscious participation in social, 
economic, political and cultural processes’ (Coulthard, Johnson and McGregor 2011: 6; 
McGregor 2004; Gough and McGregor 2007).   
 
Economic relationships are understood as being embedded in a broader context consisting 
of a political realm, a society and culture and a natural and built environment. From this 
perceptive the economy is defined as the instituted process of scarce resource allocation, by 
and to economic agents (Pouw 2011, building on Polanyi 1944). This definition enables us to 
comprehend the roles that markets, politics and society play and how they interact to shape 
the economic processes and outcomes that we observe in order to fulfill people’s unlimited 
                                                 
7  Mixed-methodology, in this paper, refers to a (1) combination, (2) alteration, or (3) integration of quantitative and 
qualitative methods and techniques. 
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wants and needs.  It entails the acknowledgement of instituted power relations that operate 
between economic agents at all levels, some of which are embodied in codified laws, rules 
and institutions and others of which are more deeply embedded in cultural values, norms, 
customs and beliefs. Economic exchange is thus not only driven by relative prices, but also 
by power differences in resource and market access and control, people’s culture and social 
habits, legal rules about factor payment, production process and product quality, and so 
forth.     
 
In this approach the economy is understood more broadly than in approaches that are 
focused on the production and exchange of only goods and money as if driven by market 
forces only and in this regard the paid and unpaid economy must be dealt with together, as 
two dimensions of an instituted process. The paid economy (monetised) refers to the 
corporate and public domains in which goods and services are produced in return for 
payment – this includes the formal and informal economy (including the subsistence, or 
barter economy), and the state that provides (subsidised) goods and services to its citizens 
and firms. The unpaid economy refers to the private domain of the economy of households 
and communities, where goods and services are produced for free by means of household or 
voluntary work and where a more diffuse concept of reciprocity operates. As much as in the 
education and training sectors of the paid economy, this is where socially and economically 
functioning, productive human beings are made. The paid and unpaid economies are 
interconnected and interdependent - one cannot function without the other. The same applies 
to the analytical distinction between the formal and informal economy – both are part of the 
same instituted economic process. We argue here that a key weakness of current economic 
frameworks and models is that it is not coherent to focus on only one (monetised) of the two 
sides of the economy. 
 
The definition of the economy as an instituted process of scarce resource allocation, by and 
to economic agents indicates the sphere of competence for economic analysis: economics 
addresses problems around the allocation of scarce resources by and to economic agents, 
both in the paid and unpaid economy. Scarcity means that resources to society are limited in 
relation to the level of individual wants and needs, in an absolute or relative sense. In either 
case allocative decisions need to be made about the distribution and use of resources. This 
broader perspective on what the economy is and does, requires us to look beyond market 
exchange as the sole allocation mechanism in the economy.8 Goods and services are also 
allocated on the basis of other mechanisms, such as (re)distribution in the public domain or 
reciprocity in the unpaid domain of individuals, households and communities. But a broader 
range of other mechanisms can also be taken into account, for example extortion, coercion 
and altruism in order to improve our understanding of how and to whom resources are 
allocated in a society.  
 
Economists have extensively explored other allocation systems such as government and the 
household but they have usually done so with the ideas and methods of market analysis (for 
extreme examples, see the work of  James Buchanan in public economics, and in the 
economics of the household the work of  Gary Becker). However, their models have been 
restrictive and their  explanations of reality have been contentious and for many 
unsatisfactory in the extent that they are far removed from what is observed and experienced 
on the ground. Neoclassical theories have failed to explain individual level decision making 
processes as influenced by social and cultural institutions, which in themselves have a 
history (habits, customs and traditions).  
 
                                                 
8  Allocation in economics refers to the production, consumption and distribution of scare resources.  
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Moreover, micro models of economic decision making based on utility theory have failed to 
explain macroeconomic processes and outcomes. Aggregating for GDP involves only the 
behaviours and products of formal constituted businesses, as opposed to all productive 
agents in the economy, and as such is part of the failure to explain the connection between 
the micro and the macro. ‘Money makes the world go around’ is an expression often heard, 
but the same is said about ‘love’ and ‘trust’. What drives the economy? Economic problems 
need to be solved in the process of allocating scarce resources and optimising quality of life. 
What steers the allocation of scarce resources? We contend that it depends on what domain 
in the economy we are looking at. Following Polanyi (1944, Polanyi, Arensberg and Pearson 
1957) we consider three interconnected domains of the economy, as well as their dominant 
(but not exclusive) allocation mechanisms:  
1. individuals & households & communities -> reciprocity and mutual support (flourish, 
aspire, strive) 
2. private sector (national and international firms) -> market exchange (live well, live better) 
3. public sector (national and international government) -> redistribution (live well together) 
 
The first, individuals, households and communities, together make up the unpaid economy. 
The second and third, the private and public sector together constitute the paid or monetised 
economy. The three domains are intrinsically connected through: the scope of decision 
making and movement of economic agents across all three domains (inter-changeably and 
simultaneously); their exchange of scarce resources; the institutions that regulate their 
behaviour; and the values embedded in those behaviours. It is not helpful to separate these 
three domains from each other. Figure 1 below is an analytical representation of the prime 
allocation mechanisms that prevail in each of the three economic domains. 
 
Within the private sector, market exchange is the dominant allocation mechanism by which 
decisions about the production, consumption and distribution of scarce resources takes 
place. Money and rules (contract law, regulation, etc.) facilitate impersonal market exchange 
between economic agents within different sectors of the economy. However, market 
exchange in real life comes in many shades: from impersonal exchange to more 
personalised forms of exchange embedded in private relations. Even without face-to-face 
contact, agents engage in market exchange out of a feeling part of so-called ‘imagined 
communities’, in the sense of Benedict Anderson (1991) – and expressed through goodwill 
and market and brand loyalty. The prime mechanisms of allocation in the public sector are 
redistribution and regulation. Governments collect taxes and earn income from assets, that 
are used to distribute and redistribute resources within the economy, for example, through 
subsidies to private companies, social investments in education and healthcare for 
individuals and households, infrastructure investments to villages and communities of people 
and through regulating the use of space and the natural environment by all economic agents. 
 
Within the unpaid economy, individuals, households and communities allocate resources on 
the basis of social mechanisms, such as reciprocity and mutual support embedded in family 
relations and social and cultural ties. The reciprocity principle supports cooperation within 
families and communities and warrants their continuity, as it rewards one positive gift or 
service by another one. Where contemporary economics sees the problem of work-life 
balance for example, very much as a personal problem, this becomes of greater societal 
concern if we see the unpaid household domain as an integral part of the economy. 
Although, exchange for money and barter takes place between individuals, households and 
communities, as does  the simple redistribution of resources, reciprocity stands out as a 
distinctive allocation mechanism. Reciprocity is also of importance in the informal economy 
and has it’s place within the private and public sectors, where it can steer market exchange 
and the public distribution of resources. However, forms of exchange based on reciprocity 
and other non-market relations are typically blindspots in economic analysis. Issues of the 
social (non-market) allocation of resources, as a result, are left to a residualist notion of 
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social policy - as if social policy is by definition politics against the market, rather than an 
integral part of it (Polanyi et al.1957; Esping-Andersen 1985).  
 
These allocation mechanisms are embedded in social-cultural and political relationships and 
institutions, each to a greater or lesser extent and depending on time, circumstances and 
place. The underlying values that drive allocation mechanisms are complex and intertwined; 
they range from the impersonal to the strongly personalised; from individual to social 
interests; from low to high-trust; illegal to legal; short-term versus long-term interests, and 
any other value from which meaning or ‘logic’ is derived by economic agents. Instead of 
assuming the maximisation of self-interest to drive economic behaviour (being ‘rational’), we 
rather say that economic agents act purposefully ultimately in pursuit of their own wellbeing 
and that of those that matter to them. 
 
Figure 1: The prime allocation mechanisms in the three economic domains 
 
 
 
 
4  On economic agency 
 
This brings us to the second concept we wish to reconsider from a pluralist perspective. At 
the heart of the welfarist approach in neoclassical economics is the assumption that all 
individuals are rational economic agents; that is people pursue the maximiation of utility in a 
self-interested manner. Most heterodox economists see this as one of the core fallacies of 
neoclassical economics. They argue that rational economic agency in the sense that it has 
been used by mainstream economics does not exist in the real world. People’s agency may 
be constrained by personal and contextual factors and economic decisions are also made 
out of social and personal custom and beliefs, collective interests, and moral, emotional and 
psychological motivations. What is an optimal choice for one human being is not necessarily 
an optimal choice for the other. People are different and pursue different priorities in life. This 
is problematic for aggregation and for the design of detailed policy that is supposed to have 
effects for real people. Although, Herbert Simon (1957) recognised and explained this many 
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years ago, the notion of the rational economic agent has marched forward in a monistic and 
exclusionary manner.  
 
For epistemological reasons Amartya Sen, among others, has argued that the rationality 
assumption in economics should not be limited to self-interest (Sen 1977, 1979). Instead, 
people are capable of giving credible commitments to courses of conduct. Social-cultural, 
political and economic institutions also influence people’s codes of conduct. Agency and the 
surrounding structure of institutions interact continuously in shaping human decisions and 
behaviour (Foucault 1978, 1982). Alternatives for the economic concept of agency have 
therefore been suggested, including the notions of ‘bounded rationality’ (first coined by 
Simon in Models of Man in 1957) and ‘purposeful behaviour’ (by Nancy Folbre in 1994). 
Simon postulated that rationality is restricted by people’s lack of information, cognitive 
abilities, and time constraints. Folbre argues that people act with a certain purpose in mind; 
this purpose may not always be the most cost-effective one, nor informed by self-interest 
only. Both concepts allow for a more heuristic interpretation of economic behaviour and 
design of behavioural models. For example, Daniel Kahneman (2003) has constructed maps 
of economic models that take bounded rationality of economic agents as the starting point. 
Instead of assuming that the economic agent is seeking an maximised solution, bounded 
rationality means that people strive for satisfactory solutions.  
 
In this paper, we adopt the purposeful behaviour concept as it indicates that people having 
some sort of a plan in mind, that they take initiatives and make choices to pursue what they 
regard as a quality of life for themselves and for others that matter to them. This is an 
argument for taking adaptive preferences seriously and a counter argument against the 
necessary assumption in the neoclassical approach of stable and lexicographically ordered 
preferences.        
 
From an inclusive economics perspective, we therefore redefine economic agency as the 
capacity to solve a human wellbeing problem. As explained in the section above, economic 
agents can be thought of as purposefully striving to protect and improve their material and 
relational conditions and their quality of life (Figure 2). The capacity of women and men  to 
solve an economic problem and reach that objective, is influenced by social constructs and 
power relations, for example, their gendered social identities, roles and relationships. 
Gendered identities embedded and reproduced in institutions, influence self-belief and 
determination. Gender may be internalised to such an extent that it, in the negative case, can 
hold people away from taking any initiative to begin with. For the other part, personal 
characteristics also play an important role. Furthermore, gender roles may co-dictate the set 
priorities and goals in life, as well as the underlying motivations from which people act and 
decide. This may range from pure, self-interest in one situation, to family and collective 
wellbeing interests in other situations. Finally, the economic agency of women and men is 
shaped by their human capital and command over scarce resources as well as political, 
social and environmental context. As is the case with gender relations, ethnicity, class and 
race also shape social identities, roles and relationships between economic agents. 
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5  From welfare to wellbeing 
 
The third theoretical/conceptual shift that we propose is to put wellbeing instead of welfare at 
the centre of our economic analysis. This implies more than just replacing one word or 
concept with another. The shift to human wellbeing has more profound repercussions for the 
underlying economic principle/axiom of the economic aggregation problem.  
 
The term ‘welfare’ has been prominent in debates through the development of neoclassical 
economics. Although the term has a long history and has wider connotations, its 
development from the nineteenth century onwards has been shaped by the emergence of 
the market economy and also the economics that has developed for understanding the 
market economy. During this process the term welfare has been reduced to refer primarily to 
material wellbeing and welfare has been set in a particular relationship to economic growth 
and production. This is illustrated by Esping-Anderson’s use of the concept of 
‘decommodification’ in his analysis of the evolution of welfare states (Esping-Anderson 
1990). In this view, economic growth is seen as the main provider of improvements in 
welfare. Growth is seen as providing jobs and for increased incomes to be invested in 
consumption, health and education, while at the same time providing the tax base from which 
to fund the services to meet the demands for these investments. In the tradition of nineteenth 
century welfare states, social welfare is then provided to those who, for one reason or 
another, are not able to benefit from economic growth.  
 
While economic growth is undoubtedly important at some stages of development to provide 
the incomes to bring populations out of absolute poverty, when we delve deeper into the 
historic and present day effects of growth we see that it does not always equate with a 
generalised improvement in the quality of life. While material conditions may improve, other 
aspects of the quality of life may suffer. Growth may be predicated on the damaging 
exploitation of the natural (the destruction of nature) or built environment (pollution) and it 
may also both depend on and generate social damage (competition and the erosion of social 
relationships). Both of these have, in turn, the potential to have negative feedback effects on 
the broader wellbeing of large sections of the population of growing economies. There is also 
increasing awareness of the significance the maldistribution of the benefits of economic 
growth and the effects that this has on individuals and societies (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009).  
Overall while economic growth may improve the material welfare of some parts of the 
population, it is clear that this is not always related to improvements in a broader notion of 
wellbeing. The Sarkozy Commission expressed an increasing awareness of the gap between 
the kind of progress that is focussed around increasing growth and that which is conducive to 
improvements in the quality of life for most citizens. This motivates us to reverse the trend 
towards a reductionist notion of welfare and to mobilise a broader conception of wellbeing 
(United Nations 1987; Sen 1999; McGregor 2004).  
 
Broadening from a narrow view of welfare, our conception of human wellbeing can be 
defined as ‘a state of being with others and the natural environment that arises where human 
needs are met, where individuals and social groups can act meaningfully to pursue their 
goals, and where they are satisfied with their way of life’ (Armitage et al. 2012: 3; McGregor 
2007). This conception of wellbeing takes into account the material, relational, and 
cognitive/subjective aspects of people’s needs and goals in life. The first dimension - material 
wellbeing - resonates with the narrower definition of welfare by looking at material 
determinants of quality of life. The relational dimension considers people’s quality of life in 
respect of the relationships that are important for them in their social and physical 
environment. The cognitive or subjective dimension of wellbeing recognises that the quality 
of the material and relational achievements are then translated into a person’s subjective 
evaluation of their quality of life. This raises questions about how satisfied people are with 
what they are able to have and do in any given natural and societal context. 
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In this formulation it is possible to recognise that real people may place different emphasis on 
the different dimensions of their wellbeing. In Figure 2, the three dimensions of wellbeing are 
drawn as a basic Venn diagram, since the three dimensions can be analytically considered 
as different sets. This is the first step in logical thinking about all possible relationships 
between the elements of the represented sets.  
 
Some people may prioritise the pursuit of their wellbeing primarily by means of material 
wellbeing (M), but at the expense of their relational (R) and subjective wellbeing (C). 
Alternatively, others may either choose to or be forced by circumstance to downplay the 
fulfilment of their material needs, prioritising instead either their relational or 
cognitive/subjective wellbeing.  
 
A desirable or valued state of wellbeing may also be pursued by means of a concerted effort 
in two dimensions (M∩R or M∩C or R∩C), but most realistically it will be a combination of all 
three dimensions together (M∩R∩C) – this is where the dimensions of wellbeing intersect. 
The realisation of quality of life can thus be assessed in an integrated and comprehensive 
manner by looking at this intersection.  
 
Figure 2: The three dimensions of wellbeing intersecting 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, we can make a distinction between (1) individual and (2) collective wellbeing. 
Although, we can speak of ‘wellbeing’ in general, these additive terms come of use when 
analysing origins and flows of human wellbeing in the economy at multiple scalar levels, 
which economists call aggregation levels. Where individual wellbeing concerns those 
processes and outcomes that determine an individual’s quality of life, collective wellbeing 
refers to the quality of life of a collective (or group) of people. This can be a household, a 
community or neighbourhood, a group of women, men, a social network, or an entire nation’s 
population. It is necessary to distinguish between the two, since we consider wellbeing an 
emergent process that stands subject to qualitative transformation when considering how it is 
M∩C M∩R 
R∩C 
M∩R∩
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aggregated to a higher, collective level. There are often trade-offs between individual and 
collective wellbeing, and between levels of wellbeing over time. By using two different 
concepts for one idea, we try to stress that we do not simply derive collective wellbeing by 
means of an endogenous summation procedure of individual utility functions to add up to 
social welfare. Instead of assuming that social welfare is maximised by maximising individual 
welfare, the notions of individual and collective wellbeing recognise the existence of trade-
offs and potential synergies. Trade-offs and synergies between individual and collective 
wellbeing are the source of qualitative transformations taking place in the aggregation from 
the micro to the macro level. People give-up and take from their individual wellbeing to the 
greater good or bad, and vice versa, and the collective may give back or take from individual 
wellbeing. This adds to our understanding of the complexity of economic decision making.  
 
Together, individuals, households, communities, firms, and governments create societies 
that can be characterised by lower or higher levels of collective wellbeing. What the outcome 
will be, depends on the trade-offs people are willing to make on behalf of others, their fellow 
human beings and what they want to share as a collective. Social groups or ‘communities’ of 
people can be decisive on how and what kind of trade-offs and synergies are being made. As 
economic agents, we form part of multiple social groups or communities at the same time. 
Society sets norms and expectations about what trade-offs and synergies will be expected 
from the individual – for example, what level of taxes you are expected to pay. Without 
venturing into the many debates around social identity and community membership and 
cohesion (or lack thereof), we simply want to highlight here that the existence of social 
groups and communities influences the allocation of scarce resources. Community rules and 
behavioural norms can shape individual economic decisions – for example, a small-scale 
fishing community in Southern India may apply specific (informal) rules regarding fishing 
days and amounts of fish that can be caught in each season in order to preserve the fish 
stock in the longer run. If fisher households want to stay a member of this community, they 
need to obey these rules. This may imply going hungry collectively in one season, in order to 
have plenty of fish in the next. In line with Bowles and Gintis (2013) we recognise form many 
empirical observations that human beings are cooperative in nature and often act in the 
interests of the collective as a means of survival. As Ray and Liew put it, “Social interactions 
enable individuals to adapt and improve faster than biological evolution based on genetic 
inheritance alone.” (2003: 386). Group or community formation is an effective vehicle to 
deliver both individual and collective wellbeing. We therefore propose that it is necessary to 
include social groups/communities as economic agents in our analytical framework. They 
form a piece of the puzzle as to what changes in the process of moving from ‘individual’ to 
‘collective’ wellbeing. However, it should be noted that our use of the term ‘community’ does 
not conflate with any normative ideas about ‘community economics’ (i.e. seeing local 
substitution as the only preferred economic system).   
 
People thus engage in economic decision making, ultimately to improve, maintain or protect 
their wellbeing. This is done by selecting the best possible combination of the three 
alternative sets of elements of wellbeing: material, social-relational and cognitive/subjective 
wellbeing. Different people will choose (or be forced to choose in the case of oppression), 
different combinations. The best outcome in one dimension is interdependent on the 
outcome in any of the other two dimensions. As such, the improvement, maintenance or 
protection of overall wellbeing represents a heuristic understanding of the decision making 
procedure that stands subject to multiple rules at the same time (non-comparable on a single 
scale), which is essentially different from the ‘maximization/minimization’ procedure 
underlying welfare economics, which is only subject to one rule (efficiency). As such, multiple 
rules guide complex human wellbeing decisions. The improvement, maintenance or 
protection of wellbeing means that each person could have a different outcome – whereas 
maximisation is only optimal in one point, which can be externally evaluated in relation to 
theory. In the case of multiple outcomes, both trade-offs and synergies exist between the 
different solutions. The evaluations of these trade-offs and synergies are made on multiple 
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scales (objective and subjective) and at different levels of aggregation (individual and at 
different levels of collective), which renders evaluation much more complex. The point is, 
however, not to lose this complexity in economic analysis.  
 
Figure 3 represents the improvement of wellbeing (across all three of its dimensions) as the 
overall objective of economic decision making within an economics of wellbeing framework. 
Trying to improve wellbeing is a continuous process; the level ultimately achieved feeds back 
into the (future) wellbeing pursued and the conditions under which this is done. Instead of 
assuming that people have stable preferences over a particular set of material, social-
relational and or cognitive/subjective aspects of wellbeing, we postulate that people are able 
to express relative priorities vis à vis one aspect or the other (e.g. M may be prioritised over 
C, M over R, C over M, C over R, R over M, or R over C) a combination of a particular kind 
(M∩C, M∩R, or C∩R), or the totality of all (M∩C∩R) - see the Venn diagram in Figure 2 from 
which the alternative solutions are derived. By studying the intersection of wellbeing 
dimensions in the above manner, we do more justice to the complexity and dynamics of 
economic decisions that are made in multiple dimensions of wellbeing at the same time, and 
may adjust constantly depending on what has been achieved or not in another dimension. 
So, where we recognise that there are three dimensions to each economic decision that we 
make, we do recognise that people may prioritise one over the other for different reasons 
and varying over time. 
 
Figure 3 – The continuous improvement of wellbeing 
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6  The Inclusive Economy Matrix 
 
To offer the analytical guidance to a comprehensive perspective on the economics of 
wellbeing, an Inclusive Economy Matrix (IEM) is constructed as presented in Figure 4. The 
term ‘inclusive’ is used here to signify our more comprehensive approach to what the 
economy is all about (as an instituted process), the broader focus on wellbeing, economic 
agency, and pluralistic vision regarding theory and method. The IEM is constructed in much 
the same way as an economic social accounting matrix (SAM).9 However, a significant 
difference is that the IEM depicts both quantitative and qualitative flows of resources 
between economic agents in the economy. This adjustment adheres to our pluralist 
perspective on economic methods. The functions presented in the matrix cells represent all 
possible interconnections between the economic agents and the unspecified variables in 
each of the three wellbeing dimensions. It should be noted that the matrix can be applied and 
filled-in (with variables and functions) at multiple levels of aggregation – from micro to macro 
to international. The specification of variables and functional relationships forms part of the 
next analytical step(s), when the framework is applied to the study of an economic problem. 
This is beyond the scope of the present paper; yet we wish to encourage further thinking on 
this by fellow economists.  
 
The IEM differentiates individuals (I) from households (H), and recognises social 
groups/communities (C) as a separate economic agent, apart from firms (F), the government 
(G) and the rest of the world (W). Net Savings (S) and Net Investments (N) close the 
scheme. The IEM is read from column to row. All economic agents are both providers and 
recipients of scarce resources, thus appearing both as column and row entries into the 
framework. The scarce resources being allocated in the economy through different forms of 
exchange between economic agents can enhance or diminish human wellbeing in its three 
dimensions: material wellbeing (M), relational wellbeing (R) and cognitive/subjective 
wellbeing (C). 
 
In order to understand the working of the scheme, let us look at an example of the flow of 
scarce resources between the individual and the household, of which she/he is a member 
(i.e. column 1, row 2). The individual (I) contributes to the household (subscript h, so 
therefore Ih), (parts of) her/his material wellbeing (Mi), in the form of income or assets, 
relational wellbeing (Ri), in the form of care and affection, and cognitive/subjective wellbeing 
(Ci), in the form of happiness or spirituality. The nature and sign of the relationship between 
the different scarce resources allocated by the individual to the household is indicated, but 
not yet specified, by a functional relationship fh. One member may contribute all of her/his 
income or assets to the household, another may contribute nothing, in which case Mi=0. The 
individual contribution to the relational wellbeing of the household may also be zero or 
negative, e.g. in the case of the individual not investing any time in household activities or 
only demanding. This applies to cognitive/subjective wellbeing as well, which may also take a 
negative form in the case of dissatisfactions or unhappiness. Vice versa, if we mirror Ih in the 
diagonal of the matrix, we can consider what households provide to its individual members, 
Hi (column 2, row 1). The household may provide shelter and home cooked meals that 
contribute to the material wellbeing of the individual household member (Mh). The household 
may also provide a sense of identity and family network to its individual members, which 
contributes to relational wellbeing (Rh). Finally, a household may add to a sense of security 
and personal satisfaction (Ch).  
 
                                                 
9  SAMs are used by economic planners to inform a wide range of different models ( e.g. general equilibrium models, 
input-output models and multiplier models) about the monetary flows between economic agents in the paid (monetised) 
economy. 
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Let us consider another example to make sure the scheme is understood. For example, the 
flow of scarce resources between a firm (Fc) and a community in which the firm is physically 
located (column 3, row 4), whereby the firm provides employment and economic activity in 
the community, thus contributing to the material wellbeing of the community (Mf). The firm 
may conduct its economic activities in an environmentally sustainable manner, which 
contributes to relational wellbeing of the community in either or both a spatial or temporal 
sense (Rf). Finally, the firm may give future economic and development prospects and a 
sense of identity to the community (Cf). Again, the nature and sign of this relationship are 
unspecified at this point, but captured by the function fc.  
 
Vice versa, if we mirror Fc in the diagonal, we can explore the flow of scarce resources 
between a social group/community and a firm, Cf (column 4, row 3). A social group/ 
community may provide for the physical space and proximity to natural resources to a firm, 
which adds to the firm’s income and profits (Mc). A social group/community may also provide 
a concentration of workers and social activities that matter for public relations of the firm 
(Rc). Finally, a social group/community may foster a public opinion in support of or against 
the economic activities and presence of the firm (Cc).       
 
The different columns and rows together aggregate to the total level of human wellbeing 
created in the economy – collective wellbeing. To ensure the framework’s robustness, each 
column corresponds to a row. The framework can encompass multiple break-downs (e.g. 
multiple layers of government) without losing its robustness – all relationships can still be 
defined within the parameters of the IEM framework. Given that both quantitative and 
qualitative values can enter the functional specifications, their outcomes cannot be simply 
aggregated on a uni-dimensional scale. The ∩ sign indicates that it concerns an intersection 
of all the different valued measures of wellbeing (as illustrated by the Venn diagram in Figure 
2). As explained in section 5, human wellbeing is an emergent process.  
 
A final note regarding the IEM framework concerns the diagonal of the scheme.10 On the 
diagonal, the differences in the allocation of scarce resources between individuals, 
households, firms, communities/social groups, layers of government and between the 
national economy and rest of the world can be analysed. By filling in the diagonal, the 
inclusive economics framework gives, prime face, reason to address inter-agent allocation 
issues, concerning relative scarce resource use, distribution, and how (dis)satisfied people 
are with that allocation, instead of looking only at the closing of the scheme - collective 
wellbeing. This gives ample room to explore the manifestations and (re)productions of 
different kinds of inequalities in an economic system.  
 
The purpose of the IEM is to guide further thinking and the development of the economic 
analysis of human wellbeing - as a process and outcome, and at multiple level of aggregation 
in the economy. The depicted relationships in the scheme are now unspecified, meaning that 
the nature, sign and direction of the functional relationships between economic agents and 
resources are not yet formulated. Subsequent research could address the specification of 
these relationships, and resolve the methodological challenge of integrating the quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of multi-dimensional wellbeing. Once functional relationships 
between different entries in the IEM are specified, it can be used as analytical tool to study 
the (projected) impact of policy and change in an economy in more applied terms. Policy 
alternatives can also be studied on the basis of a specified IEM, in order to stimulate 
scenario type thinking on different human wellbeing development trajectories.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10  It is worthwhile noting that in a traditional SAM the diagonal is empty. 
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Figure 4: The Inclusive Economy Matrix  
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;Gw;Sw) 
Nett 
Investments 
(N) 
Ni Nh Nf Nc Ng Nw Allocation 
of 
investment 
Si+Sh+Sf+Sc+Sg+
Sw=Ni+Nh+Nf+Nc
+Ng+Nw 
Total 
Expended UjUi{Ih;If;Ic; Ig;Iw;Ni} 
UjUh{Hi;Hf;Hc; 
Hg;Hw;Nh} 
UjUf{Fi;Fh;Fc; 
Fg;Nf} 
UjUc{Ci;Ch;Cf; 
Cg;Nc} 
UjUg{Gi;Gh;Gf; 
Gc;Gw;Ng} 
UjUw{Wi;Wh;Wf; 
Wc;Wg;Ng}  
Collective  
Wellbeing 
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7  Final reflections and future research 
 
In this paper we have made a series of proposals for an alternative framework of thinking 
about the economics of human wellbeing from a pluralist perspective. These proposals were 
made at three inter-related levels: (1) at the conceptual/theoretical level; (2) at the level of  
economic principles and axioms; and (3) at the level of methodology.  
 
First, at the conceptual and theoretical level, with regard to the definition of ‘economy’ we 
have proposed to define the economy more broadly in terms of an instituted process of 
scarce resource allocation, by and to economic agents. This definition takes account of the 
social and political context in which economic decisions are made, and provides an entry 
point into the analysis of instituted power relations between economic agents that, ultimately, 
determine outcomes. We also proposed in line with others to interpret economic agency as 
the capacity to (satisfice) solve an economic (scarcity) problem. Instead of (stable) 
preferences, we propose to look at needs, satisfactions and priorities that are conditional on 
quality of life achieved and can adapt over time and experience. Finally, we propose to shift 
the prime focus of our economic analysis to human wellbeing, rather than welfare.  
 
Second, at the methodological level, a pluralistic approach does not preclude an overarching 
methodological approach. This implies that, depending on the problem at hand, a mixed-
methodology approach would qualify as a sound methodology as long as it follows from a 
robust analytical framework. In this paper, we took the example of the economic aggregation 
problem. Instead of assuming social welfare to be the sum-total of a set of individual welfare 
functions, we adopt the concept of wellbeing and the principle of emergence to be applicable 
in aggregating from individual to collective wellbeing. 
 
Third, and finally, the IEM is proposed as an analytical framework of thinking about flows and 
trade-offs between different dimensions of wellbeing and between individual and collective 
wellbeing. The IEM signals flows of both a quantitative and qualitative nature and can be 
applied at multiple scale levels. As such, the IEM offers a comprehensive and robust 
framework that can be considered a first step for formulating new research questions, 
exploring functional relationships, and building new models. Putting wellbeing at the centre of 
economics, gives expression to our interest in how economic processes and policies affect 
the human wellbeing of present and future generations. This interest is grounded in both 
instrumental and moral motivations. The first steps in this direction have been taken by 
behavioural, anthropological, feminist and political economists and it is upon these 
contributions that we seek to build. As economists we want better guidance on how best to 
allocate scarce and sometime finite resources in respect of societal values. From a moral 
perspective we are concerned about inter-temporal and inter-spatial distributions and what is 
socially just both now and for the future.  
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